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EFFECTS OF FASANO ON LOCAL LAND USE
DECISION-MAKING
CIRCLING THE SQUARES OF
EUCLIDEAN ZONING: ZONING
PREDESTINATION AND PLANNING
FREE WILL
By

JAMES BROSS*

Thanks to the Oregon Supreme Court, my days are filled with
excitement. I nearly missed my chance when the county amended
the zoning code to allow a duplex next to me; the court halted that
blight fast. Now the county has followed the court's lead and approved a conditional use for a 500 bed hospitaland methadone clinic
next door. Talk about your compatibility.'
Imaginary Happy Homeowner

However unlikely it may be that this paean has been uttered,
such is the stuff of traditional land use control logic. The Oregon
appellate cases which pursue that logic have been neatly summarized and categorized in recent writings.' Despite their apparent
"inconsistency" 3 those cases are not aberrations among the run of
land use decisions; the Oregon appellate courts, like other courts,
have been groping from a system for reviewing local zoning decisions. Past decisions had locked the court into a process of review
in which formal mechanisms of change were limited to "adjusting
individual injuries where the regulation bears too heavily and helping to locate exceptional uses * * *."I
* Associate Professor of Law, Lewis and Clark Law School-Northwestern
School of Law. A.B., Catholic University, 1966; J.D., 1969; LL.M., University of
Pennsylvania Law School, 1971.
1. In Roseta v. County of Washington, 254 Ore. 161, 458 P.2d 405 (1969), the
Oregon Supreme Court struck down a zoning code amendment from "single family
residential" to "duplex residential." The court held such amendments to be spot
zoning and to lack the usual legislative presumption of validity. On the same day,

Justice O'Connell handed down Archdiocese of Portland v. County of Washington,
254 Ore. 77, 458 P.2d 682 (1969); Roseta was found inapplicable to such compatible

conditional uses as auditoriums, colleges and hospitals. Id. at 84, 458 P.2d at 685.
Hereinafter, the two decisions will be treated as a single statement of policy and
cited as Roseta/Archdiocese.
2. Sullivan, From Kroner to Fasano:An Analysis of Judicial Review of Land
Use Regulation in Oregon, 10 WILL. L.J. 358 (1974).
3. Id.
4. Krasnowiecki, The Basic System of Land Use Control: Legislative Preregu-
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Now the Oregon Supreme Court has spoken new words on land
use in Fasano v. Washington County5 and Baker v. City of
Milwaukie. The procedural and substantive techniques for dealing with those cases are treated in subsequent articles in this series. This introductory article will examine the context of those
new words on land use. Although the apparent thrust of
Fasano/Bakeris to revise the treatment of land use problems under
judicial review, a continuation of the prior judicial mind set will
cause new words to reproduce the same logic. The source of the old
logic and its specific manifestations in early decisions will be examined so that the Fasano/Baker cases can be checked for evidence of relapse.
The Fasano/Bakerpairing overtly deals with three basic areas:
1. The controlling and underlying process of land use
regulation is to be the generalized process of planning rather
than the specific tool of zoning;7
2. Because the zoning of particular parcels of land
must now be viewed in its relationship to the controlling plan,
the nature of individual decisions on particular parcels is relation v. Administrative Discretion, in THE NEW ZONING: LEGAL, ADMINISTRATIVE,
AND ECONOMIC CONCEPrS AND TECHNIQUES 5 (N. Marcus & M. Groves, ed. 1970); see
also D. MANDELKER, THE ZONING DILEMMA 72-74, 84-86 (1971).

5. 264 Ore. 574, 507 P.2d 23 (1973). Fasano, a neighboring landowner and
attorney, challenged the county decision to grant a floating zone permit for a trailer
park in Fasano's single-family neighborhood. Justice Howell concluded that the
floating zone decision was one of a class of "quasi-judicial" decisions applying
general policy to particular parcels of land. Such quasi-judicial decisions are administrative applications of the general policy found in the comprehensive plan and
must be carried out in compliance with the comprehensive plan. Finally, Justice
Howell listed procedural rules to govern quasi-judicial hearings. See subsequent
articles in this symposium for elaboration of those rules.
6. 75 Adv. Sh. 1068, 533 P.2d 772 (Ore. 1975). Justice Howell wrote that
"[ulpon passage of a comprehensive plan a city assumes a responsibility to affectuate that plan and conform prior conflicting zoning ordinances to it." Id. at 1081,
533 P.2d at 779. Baker clarified Fasano in two respects. It affirmed that differences
between city zoning enabling legislation in ORE. REV. STAT. § 227.010 et seq. and
county zoning enabling legislation in ORE. REV. STAT. § 215.010 et seq. were not
relevant to the policy establishing the comprehensive plan as the "controlling land
planning instrument." Further, Baker imposed an affirmative duty to make implementation comply with plans while Fasano required such compliance in ruling on
cases brought to the government by a landowner seeking permits.
7. Fasano, 264 Ore. at 582, 507 P.2d at 27; Baker, 75 Adv. Sh. at 1081, 533 P.2d
at 779.
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examined and relabelled as "administrative/quasi-judicial"
rather than legislative; 8
3. As a result of the relabelling of the decisions on particular parcels, appropriate procedures for quasi-judicial
hearings must be created?

That prior decision makers should have assumed that they
were dealing with zoning rather than planning is not surprising.
Despite attempts in commentaries to assert the existence of a generalized phenomenon called "land use planning and control,"'" a
score-keeper who read only judicial decisions would find scarce
evidence of anything other than "zoning." The Atlantic and Pacific reports in the last three years contain over 500 zoning cases,
while in the same period they report fewer than a dozen cases
reviewing such well established controls as subdivision regulations.
Those in the judiciary who dealt with the issue of land use strictly
in terms of zoning as it appears in the traditional zoning forms of
action have been hard put to see common elements in problems
before them." To assert the primacy of the planning process over
zoning and to conceptualize about the general problem of making
decisions to implement plans required affirmative action to seek
out information which would not come to appellate judges in the
2
usual run of cases.'
Professor Jan Krasnowiecki has given workable descriptions of
both the zoning and planning views:
The theory behind the [current zoning] system is that the
members of a community can sit down one fine day and determine
not only the general nature of its future development but also every
detail to such a precise extent that very little need be left to the
discretion of an on-going administrative process. The idea * * *
rests on the assumption that it has a clear vision of an end state for
8. Fasano, 264 Ore. at 580-81, 507 P.2d at 26-27.
9. Id. at 586-88, 507 P.2d at 29-30.
10. See, e.g., J. DELAFONS, LAND-USE CONTROLS INTHE UNITED STATES (2d ed.
PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE OF URBAN PLANNING (W. Goodman & E. Freund ed.
1968); N. WILLIAMS, AMERICAN PLANNING LAW: LAND USE AND THE POLICE POWER

1969);

(1974).
11. Justice O'Connell's difficulties in handling Roseta/Archdiocese are an example of the quandaries posed by treating zoning forms of action such as amendments or conditional uses as different issues rather than two names for the same
issue. See MANDELKER, supra note 4.
12. This affirmative action included a request that counsel in Fasano reargue
certain specific issues, including the role of the comprehensive plan.
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itself * * *.[I]t subscribes to a static end state concept of land use
control.'•
[LIand use control should be viewed as a dynamic, on-going
process
Land use and development is subject matter that demands controls which are capable of relating sensitively to the variables in each
individual instance and which recognize that the variables are
themselves in the process of continuing change. In order to reflect
this characteristic of the subject matter, local governments should
be authorized to employ the administrative function as widely as its
nature demands."
Pre-Fasano cases may be expected to display the "static end
state concept" which typifies zoning. Indeed, the pre-Fasanomind
set may be a consequence of this very "static end state concept."
To the extent that Fasano/Baker embodies change, it may be expected to move toward facilitating a "dynamic, on-going process

[employing] the administrative function * * * widely."
THE STATIC END STATE IN OREGON DECISIONS
A.

Inherent Obstacles to Change in the Zoning System

Although earlier Oregon decisions make frequent use of the
word "plan," it formed part of the phrase "comprehensive zoning

plan"'" which the court considered the standard of stability. Supported, as it is in cases," by citation to enabling legislation's
"comprehensive plan,"' 8 the phrase might be read as evidence that
Fasano/Bakeroffers no innovation. While Fasano/Baker indeed
may offer no innovation, it is evident that "comprehensive zoning
13. Krasnowiecki, supra note 4, at 4.
14. Id. at 10.
15. Id. at 7-8.
16. See, e.g. Roseta, 254 Ore. at 164-69, 458 P.2d at 407-09; Archdiocese, 254
Ore. at 83-84, 458 P.2d at 685; Smith v. County of Washington, 241 Ore. 380, 384,
406 P.2d 545, 547 (1965). This phrase also appeared in the early case of Village of
Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 379 (1926).
17. Smith, 241 Ore. at 383-84, 406 P.2d at 547.
18. ORE. REV. STAT. § 227.240 (1973) has, since its passage in 1919, urged cities
to give reasonable consideration in zoning to, among other things, "a wellconsidered plan." ORE. REV. STAT. § 215.050 (1973) requires counties to adopt
comprehensive plans; since adoption of ORE. REV. STAT. 215.010 et seq. as enabling
legislation in 1947, counties have been told to zone "in accordance with a comprehensive plan."
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plan" embodies the "static end state" rather than the "dynamic
on-going process."
Rather than acting as a separate standard against which zoning can be judged, the "comprehensive zoning plan" is found in the
zoning; it is a "gestalt" abstracted from the zoning ordinance and
tested against the actual pattern of development."9 The "comprehensive zoning plan" does not make a "continuous on-going
contribution"; it merely responds to physical changes in the environment thrust upon it by such outside forces as the Highway
Department."0 An amending ordinance which is not a response to
such outside forces of change is a "deviation." 1
Krasnowiecki has given a starting point to predict the consequences of this static end state: it "is a system that is called upon
to react to constantly changing circumstances with a machinery
that was designed to handle a static world." 2 Thus the system will
contain an inherent tension between the reality of constant change
and inadequate legal mechanisms for responding to such change.
Two ills could flow from this tension. Either necessary change will
be thwarted because of systematic bias toward stasis, or floods of
unreviewed and possibly abusive change will rush through a system unequipped to evaluate change.
Evidence substantiates the existence of both ills.2" More significant for an examination of judicial mind set is a pattern of
decisions based upon a belief that one or the other extreme is
typical of the local system. Like most persons dealing with a
language-based system, judges respond to the concepts in law in
terms of some picture of the usual instance of the concept. 4 It is
19. Smith, 241 Ore. at 384, 406 P.2d at 547.
20. Id. It is a striking commentary on the narrow scope of land use control
available under zoning that highways should be considered an alien impact on land
use control rather than an essential tool for implementation of plans.
21. Archdiocese, 254 Ore. at 83, 458 P.2d at 685.
22. Krasnowiecki, supra note 4, at 4.
23. See R. BABCOCK, THE ZONING GAME 50-61 (1966) for a discussion of the
public preferences for stability. It is in the setting of exclusionary zoning that courts

most often find insufficient change. See, e.g., Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp. v.
Arlington Heights, 517 F.2d 409 (7th Cir. 1975). Excess change may be the result
of overt corruption. Freilich & Larson, Conflict of Interest: A Model Statutory
Proposal, 38 U.M.K.C. L. REV. 373, 390-98 (1970). However it is more often the
result of systemic indifference. Note, Zoning Variances and Exceptions: The Phila-

delphia Experience, 103 U. PA. L. REV. 516 (1955).
24. L. WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS,
(1968); H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 121-26 (1961).

I-

109, 115, 137-142

ENVIRONMENTAL LAW

[Vol. 6

not difficult to discern the Oregon Supreme Court's image of the
typical zone change proceeding. In that picture, local governments
are unwilling or unable to resist pressures for wholesale scrapping
of the zoning ordinance, proponents of change are venal or insensitive to broader interests, and neighboring landowners are society's
bastion against environmental destruction.25 Justice O'Connell
quotes commentary from an earlier Kentucky opinion:
[T]he common practice of zoning agencies * * * is simply to
wait until some property owner finds an opportunity to acquire a
financial advantage * * * and then struggle with the question of
whether some excuse can be found for complying with his request
for a rezoning."5
With defenses erected against change within a system already illprepared for change, the dismal reception change has received in
Oregon appellate opinions should be anticipated. 7
The direction taken in such earlier cases could be viewed as
simply reinforcing and forwarding the policies chosen by the legislative branch in its establishment of the system of "static end
state." Indeed, many of the problems experienced with land use
regulations in Oregon have been inherent in the system and have
occurred with neither facilitation nor discouragement from the
judiciary. A brief list of such predictable problems would include:
1. The process is preoccupied with quirks of the zoning
system. Instead of asking "what are the goals of our community and how shall we reach them," communities ask
"how shall we zone?" In response to that question, the City
of Portland has overzoned huge areas within its boundaries
for intensive uses such as industrial or high-rise apartment
development. Such overzoning was designed to prevent the
zoning of precisely enough land for intensive uses from leading to overpricing of land so zoned. In attempting to avoid a
25. Fasano, 264 Ore. at 589-90, 507 P.2d at 30-31 (concurring opinion).
26. Roseta, 254 Ore. at 167-68, 458 P.2d at 408-09, citing Fritts v. City of
Ashland, 348 S.W.2d 712, 714-15 (Ky. 1961). Fasano also related the image of the
"almost irresistible pressures that can be asserted by private economic interests on
local governments"; its discussion, however, is part of a conscious balancing of such
fears against the "dangers of making desirable change more difficult." Fasano, 264
Ore. at 587-88, 507 P.2d at 30.
27. Sullivan, supra note 2, found that of 15 quasi-judicial permits approved by
local governments and reviewed by Oregon appellate courts before 1974, 11 were
reversed.
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zoning problem, the city inadvertently weakened sound residential areas by encouraging speculation on unrealistic possibilities of intensive development; increased property taxes
and decreased maintenance have been typical results of such
speculation."8
2. Goals which cannot be reached by Euclidean zoning
may never be considered. The adopted plan of the Northwest
District of the City of Portland has as its "Major Goal" that
"[t]he Northwest District should serve and house a diverse
population close to the center of the City consisting of a mixture of land use which provides a functional, stimulating and
livable environment for its users * * *.25 The goal is so alien
to previous systems of regulation that full implementation of
the goal requires redrafting of the city code to *create a new
system of control.3"
3. Subsystems of the land development process are not
likely to be seen as potential devices for implementing plans;
rather they will be permitted to operate independently in
ways that thwart city goals. In the overzoning problem discussed earlier, property taxation operated to hinder housing
stock maintenance. Only in the 1975 Session of the Oregon
Legislature was action taken to turn the Property Tax to an
implementation tool to facilitate the city goals.31

Solutions to problems caused by the prior zoning system frequently demand changes in the prior pattern of zoning. Recovery
from overzoning for industrial use and inserting controls designed
to meet broader gcals than those of conventional zoning involve
28. PROPOSED DRAFT, MODEL CITIES COMPREHENSIVE PLAN FOR PORTLAND 16-17

(1973).
29. Portland Bureau of Planning, Northwest District Policy Plan 1-6 (Adopted
July, 1975).
30. "The Council passed a motion instructing the City Planning Commission
to immediately proceed on the development of a mixed use zoning proposal for
possible application in the Northwest District and other appropriate areas
Id. at 1-8.
31. The 1975 Session of the Oregon Legislature passed H.B. 2343, ch. 428
[1975] Ore. Laws Adv. Sh., permitting cities to designate areas close to central
business districts (effectively limited by the language of the bill to downtown Portland at the present time) in which owners of property may seek 10-year property
tax exemption for new high-rise apartment development. It also passed H.B. 2344,
ch. 355 [1975] Ore. Laws Adv. Sh., and H.B. 2342 ch. 696 [1975] Ore. Laws Adv.
Sh., designed to remove property tax disincentives to maintenance and rehabilitation of single family.housing and aging apartment buildings.
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alterations in the land use ordinance. Judicial restraints on change
obstruct solutions to problems inherent in the zoning system.
B.

Obstacles to Change Superimposed by Judicial Mind Set

In addition to those facets of the static end state in which
courts have followed legislative leads by reinforcing inherent limitations, at least one contribution to the zoning system is uniquely
judicial. In attempting to solve the problems of particular cases as
they appear before the judiciary, the judicial habit is to seek analogies in prior cases which have attractive similarities to the instant
case." If the Krasnowiecki planning view were operative, a court
might find analogies to land use problems in prior litigation dealing with administrative implementation of legislative policy; however, such analogies are infrequently used because "the exercise of
administrative discretion under the (zoning) ordinance was conceived as a tangential rather than an integral phase." 33
The analogies actually used in zoning decisions will depend to
a large extent on the judicial view of the legal area into which
zoning fits-in effect, on the judicial view of the legal language
game of which theowords of zoning may be a part. Donald Hagman
has found that teachers of zoning fall into property or local government law areas.34 Although courts do not carry the convenient
indicia that permit identification of teachers as either property or
local government law people, the courts' choice is still between the
same two basic areas. Those courts placing zoning into a property
context will be inclined to find spoken and unspoken analogies in
property doctrines.
Under the static end state concept making use of zoning to
preserve districted hierarchies of uses, the related property analogy
is temptingly nestled in the consensual systems of land use control
known as covenants. At times,. the analogy to covenants has been
carried out explicitly." Zoning can be said to resemble the mu32. H. BERMAN & W. GREINER, THE NATURE AND FUNCTION OF THE LAW 416-19
(3d ed. 1972).
33. Mandelker, Delegation of Power and Function in Zoning Administration,

1963

WASH.

U.L.Q. 60, 98.

34. Hagman, The Teaching of Land- Use Controls and PlanningLaw in A merican Law Schools, 1972 LAND USE CONTROLS ANNUAL 61.

35. Frankland v. City of Lake Oswego, 267 Ore. 452, 474-75, 517 P.2d 1042,
1053 (1973). Although a post-Fasano case, its Fasano-related issues were sidestepped. It dealt with an apartment building constructed on a hill-top in the path
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tually enforceable equitable servitudes evidenced by a private developer's common scheme of development"6 or to resemble legal
convenants running with the land. 37 In instances of express analogy, a consciousness of the nature of the activity of analogizing
retards the drawing of unjustified inferences of comparability.
When the analogy is not express, the chance of mistaken comparisons increases."8
The temptation to draw analogies from private systems of
controls by promise is strengthened by the ease with which specific
covenant models can be found for the usual run of zoning problems
faced by the judiciary. Among the enticing zoning-covenants counterparts are:
1. The "comprehensive zoning plan" is treated similarly to the common scheme of development. Both are inferred from an original writing, evidenced by patterns of actual development, and give rise to enforceable legal rights in
neighboring landowners.39
2. The hardship variance to the zoning restrictions and
equitable relief from servitudes after a change in circumstances are often treated as part of a similar question: is the
value and usefulness of the lot as restricted so unfairly reduced as to justify lifting the zoning or covenant restriction? 4"
of adjoining landowners' expensive views of Mt. Hood. The apartment's construction was held illegal because it exceeded the height shown in drawings submitted
to the City as part of a P.U.D. final development plan approval.
36. "One of the theories underlying a suit by an adjoining landowner * * *
[draws] an analogy between rights accruing to a third party beneficiary under
contract and the rights of adjoining landowners under a zoning ordinance."
Frankland, 267 Ore. at 474, 517 P.2d at 1053. Rodgers v. Reimann, 227 Ore. 62, 361
P.2d 101 (1961), found the Oregon courts "free to employ * * * as the case may
demand" a third party beneficiary theory to support suits by a prior grantee upon
a covenant subsequently made by his grantor. Id. at 69-70, 361 P.2d at 104-05.
37. "A variant of this approach would analogize a covenant running with land
in a deed with a zoning ordinance * * *
'[T]he benefits flowing from the enactment of zoning regulations, in return
for the restrictionsimposed by them, accrue not only to the municipality,
representing the general public, but also to the abutting property owners.'"
Frankland, 267 Ore. at 475, 517 P.2d at 1053, quoting DeBlasiis v. Bartell, 143 Pa.
Super. 485, 491-92, 18 A.2d 478, 481 (1941).
38. 0. BOUWSMA, PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAYS 187-92 (1969). N. WILLIAMS, supra note
10, at 2.01 n.5, cites Fasano as an example of "implicit rather than articulate"
support of a property rights theory of neighbors' interest.
39. Compare Smith, 241 Ore. at 383-84, 406 P.2d at 547-48 with Rodger v.
Reimann, 277 Ore. 62, 361 P.2d 101 (1961).
40. The Inn, Home for Boys v. City of Portland, 16 Ore. App. 497, 500, 519P.2d
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3. The treatment of amendments to zoning codes under
the so-called Maryland Change or Mistake Doctrine' with
which the Oregon courts flirted42 is identical to equitable
bases for relief from servitudes. Under that doctrine, amendments applicable to small parcels must be justified by evidence of either a mistake in the original zoning or a change
in the neighborhood of the surrounding parcels. Similarly,
evidence of mutual mistake" or change in the neighborhood44
may result in relief in equity from consensual private controls.
4. Early zoning ordinances demanded consent of neighbors to changes in zoning;45 neighbor consent still results in
simplified change procedures under some city codes.", Such
zoning by agreement reemphasizes the similarity of public
control and private agreement.
The development of doctrines of public regulation based upon
analogies to private regulation may be harmless in many instances; but their pervasive use can be hazardous. 7 The use of the
390, 392 (1974) quotes the 1969 version of the PORTLAND, ORE., CODE §33.106.010
permiting granting of a variance "as may be necessary to secure an appropriate
improvement of a lot * * * that * * * cannot otherwise be appropriately improved
without such modifications." Downs v. Kroeger, 200 Cal. 743, 254 P. 1101 (1927),
refused to enforce a residential restrictive covenant because "defendant's property
is essentially business property, and if he is restrained from using it for the only
purpose for which it is now suitable and available, he will be irreparably damaged
•*

*

4"

41. See MANDELKER, supra note 4, at 89.
42. Roseta, 254 Ore. at 166 n.5, 458 P.2d at 408 n.5. The court of appeals
decision in Fasano, 7 Ore. App. 176, 489 P.2d 693 (1972), assumed that Oregon had
adopted the Maryland Change or Mistake Doctrine.
43. 3 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 12.86 (1953).
44. Trustees of Columbia College v. Thacher, 87 N.Y. 311 (1882), withheld
equitable enforcement of a private servitude because "there ha[d] been such an
entire change in the character of the neighborhood of the premises." Id. at 316.
45. Roman Catholic Archbishop v. Baker, 140 Ore. 600, 15 P.2d 391 (1932).
46. The Portland City Code facilitates zoning amendments when there is consent by more than 50% of property owners within the change boundaries and within
150' of the boundary. PORTLAND, ORE., CODE § 33.102.020(2) (1969) as amended by
PORTLAND, ORE., ORDINANCE 139117 and 139702 (1975).
47. The use of private property models has been pervasive in Oregon zoning
cases. Complete delegation to neighbors of control over rezones has been struck
down when the delegation occurred without standards to govern neighborhood discretion. Roman Catholic Archbishop v. Baker, 140 Ore. 600, 15 P.2d 391 (1932).
However, the same delegation might be valid if properly governed by standards.
Moreover, the courts have reiterated that the reaction of neighbors is an appropri-
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property language game as the context of zoning words may interfere with solution of problems that are more properly part of the
local government law language game; "the moves that are part of
the one language game (may not) be a part of the other." 4 8 The
public interest in land use regulation by government control may
become privatized in the hands of a few adjoining property owners.
The issue in cases ceases to be "Have we zoned to achieve the
public good" and becomes "Have we protected the rights of neighbors." Landowners are given-without paying for them-zoning
rights in neighboring property which "cannot be bargained away"
by the local authority which originally lassed the zoning restrictions.
Although the neighboring landowner could simply act as-agent
to protect the public interest,49 the actual language of Oregon cases
indicates that the neighbor's rights may over-rule the public interest. The most telling language in this regard is found in Smith v.
Washington County:
The only debatable question * * * was whether or not to sacrifice the rights of nearby residential property owners in order to encourage industry, and its attendant payroll. This debate, under the
circumstances of the case, was irrelevant. Whatever the merits of
the industry may have been, this court has held that the rights of
ate inquiry for judicial evaluation of a zone change. Perkins v. Marion County, 252
Ore. 313, 321, 448 P.2d 374, 377 (1969). Opinions are replete with references to the
percentages of neighbors supporting or opposing a zone change. See, e.g., Holt v.
Salem, 192 Ore. 200, 234 P.2d 564 (1951); Shaffner v. Salem, 201 Ore. 45, 268 P.2d
599 (1954). The character of neighborhood surroundings is relevant to private equitable restrictions. Sanborn v. McLean, 233 Mich. 227, 206 N.W. 496 (1925). It is a
recurring consideration in zoning disputes. See, e.g., Shaffner, 201 Ore. at 55, 268
P.2d at 603; Follmer v. Lane County, 5 Ore. App. 185, 480 P.2d 722 (1971).
48. Cook, Wittgenstein on Privacy, 74 THE PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW 281, 287
(1965).

49. In a recent discussion of standing to challenge quasi-judicial decisions by
writ of review, Chief Judge Schwab quoted the briefs of the Northwest Environmental Defense Center:
"The third and seemingly most liberal interpretation [of standing] is that
individuals within the community have standing as sort of private attorney
generals to assert the communities' interest in -the scenic beauties of their
community."
Duddles v. City Council of West Linn, 75 Adv. Sh. 1652, 1664-65, 535 P.2d 583, 591
(Ore. App. 1975).aFor a challenge to the need for "private attorney generals" see

Krasnowiecki, Planned Unit Development: A Challenge to EstablishedTheory and
Practice of Land Use Control, 114 U. PA. L. REV. 47 (1965).
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residential property owners to rely upon the protection of the comprehensive zoning plan cannot be bargained away. 5°
At a time when the issue of exclusionary zoning ordinances is
the subject of intensive scrutiny,5 the reinforcement of a landowner's right to preserve low-density single-family zoning is especially inappropriate. Absent evidence of a change in neighborhood,
or a mistake in the original zoning, the language of Smith would
seem to uphold the neighbor's "right to exclude" low income, highdensity housing, "whatever the merits" of low-income housing.
In addition to privatizing the public interest in the substance
of zoning, the covenant analogy privatized the remedies for violation of the public interest. Frankland'sconclusion from its private
law analogies was that an appropriate remedy for an illegally constructed apartment building was money damages to adjoining
property owners. 52 Although the additional density caused by
added stories in an apartment house impacts upon a broader public through increased traffic and similar externalities, the public
interest can be quieted by a money payment to a few neighbors.53
If few enough adjacent owners suffer damages, violation of the
public laws can be treated as a minimal overhead item to be recovered easily by the sale of additional units. If the damages in
'Franklandwere primarily from obstruction of a scenic vista by a
five story structure, why not build a fifty story structure; the obstruction and resulting damages remain constant while the rewards of a massive violation of the law increase dramatically.
THE PLANNING/ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS IN OREGON AFTER Fasano

At first glance, Fasano/Bakerappears to contain several clusters of words suggestive of the process described by Krasnowiecki
50. Smith, 241 Ore. at 387, 406 P.2d at 549 (emphasis added).
51. See, e.g., Southern Burlington County v. Mt. Laurel, 67 N.J. 151, 336 A.2d
713 (1975). Fasano could be viewed as facilitating exclusionary zoning since the
income of the potential trailer park residents could have been considerably lower
than the single-family zone residents.
52. Frankland,.267 Ore. at 480-83, 517 P.2d at 1056.
53. The Franklandcase was, in fact, settled by money payment to the plaintiff
neighbors. The Oregonian (Portland),Aug. 1, 1975, at 34, cols. 3-5. Money to a few
neighbors as remedy for a breach of the public law in placing additional stories on
an apartment building contrasts with the settlement of a similar issue in New York
City; there, additional stories were committed to low income housing for the elderly. In New York, a breach of the public's law was compensated by a public
benefit. N.Y. Times, Apr. 13, 1975, § 1, at 35, col. 1.
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as an alternate to the "static end state." Among the dominant
characteristics found by Krasnowiecki in the planning process are:
1.

the legislative function * * * to state as much in the way of

rules and standards as is necessary to assure that the administrator
will carry out the policy of the legislature; 5
2. the administrativt function employed as widely as its nature
demands;"
3. the distinction between legislative and administrative functions
in terms of regulation * * * and order-a regulation as a rule of

standard or general applicability and future effect and an order as
an action taken in a particular case;5"
4. procedural and substantive provisions specially designed" 7 and
quasi-judicial hearings."
The mere use of judicial words that resonate with sounds remi54. Krasnowiecki, supra note 4, at 8. Baker cites favorably the following interpretation of Fasano by the Oregon Attorney General: "The comprehensive plan is
thus analogous to legislation granting rule-making power but establishing the purpose for which and the limits within which that power may be exercised." Baker,
75 Adv. Sh. at 1073 n.6, 533 P.2d at 775 n.6, quoting 36 Ore. Op. Att'y Gen. 1044,
1046 (1974). Justice Howell gives an example of the manner in which legislative
policy may be stated in a plan in Fasano, 264 Ore. at 586-87 n.3, 507 P.2d at 29
n.3.
55. Krasnowiecki, supra note 4, at 8.
"[W]e read Fasano as saying that the scope of judicial review is limited to
an examination of the administrative record for the purpose of ascertaining
that: (1) the proper procedures were followed; (2) the relevant factors were
consideredby the agency; and (3) there was reliable, probative and substantial evidence to support the decision of the agency."
Dickinson v. Clackamas County, 75 Adv. Sh. 1420, 1421, 533 P.2d 1395, 1396 (Ore.
App. 1975).
56. Krasnowiecki, supra note 4, at 10. Fasano, 264 Ore. at 580-81, 507 P.2d at
26, distinguishes legislative from administrative, quasi-judicial decisions: legislative authority is exercised by "laying down general policies without regard to a
specific piece of property" whereas a quasi-judicial decision is a "determination
whether the permissible use of a specific piece of property should be changed
57. Krasnowiecki, supra note 4, at 11. In Green v. City of Eugene, 75 Adv. Sh.
2821, 2822, 538 P.2d 368, 369 (Ore. App. 1975), Chief Judge Schwab expressed his
reluctance to make wholesale adoptions of judicial procedures for quasi-judicial
hearings. Such rigid importation of courtroom rules would "amount to a holding
that citizens supporting or opposing a requested land use proceed at their own peril
unless they retain an attorney." Judge Schwab's concern for whether rigid rules
would be appropriate for the broad spectrum of settings in which land use issues
arise is in keeping with Fasano's claim that it "contains no absolute standards or
mechanical tests." 264 Ore. at 588, 507 P.2d at 30.
58. Krasnowiecki, supra note 4, at 12.
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niscent of the planning/administrative process is no guarantee that
the substance of the law has left the static end state.
Roseta/Archdiocese contained similar resonances 9 but represent
the Oregon apotheosis of the static end state. Fasano/Baker'sreso6
nances are clearly not the same as those in Roseta/Archdiocese.'
Fasano shares with prior cases an impression that decisions
made locally are insufficiently resistant to change . " Its response to
that impression differs from the responses in former cases. Suspicions of abusive change were treated in prior cases indirectly under
such titles as "spot zoning,"62 within the framework of traditional
zoning categories such as amendment or conditional use, and with-3
out an awareness of adverse consequences of restricting change.1
In Fasano, the potential for abusive change to benefit individual
landowners is treated in a single category of quasi-judicial decisions, not under the rubric of several scattered zoning forms of
action such as variance or amendment. Restraint on change within
that category of quasi-judicial decisions is reached directly as a
result of a particular conscious view of the pressures on local governments and through a technique-burdens and standards of
proofs-designed explicitly to address the assumed abuses. 4 If it
can be demonstrated to the judiciary that the pressures do not
exist-perhaps because the State Land Conservation and Development Commission has reinforced the integrity of local processes
through its administrative powers-an alteration of the restraint
is easily accommodated. 5
59. "A council, in passing upon an application for a special use permit, acts
as administrative agency." Archdiocese, 254 Ore. at 82, 458 P.2d at 684. However,
in describing the same council actions, Justice O'Connell speaks of "reviewing the
legislative action of a governmental unit engaged in carrying out a land use policy
forumulated by it." Id. at 86, 458 P.2d at 686. Roseta, 254 Ore. at 163, 458 P.2d at
406-07, reasserts the language of the enabling act as authority that "[any zoning
ordinance adopted by the county must be predicated upon 'a comprehensive plan
* * *.'"The court then quotes the phrase "comprehensive zoning plan" from
Smith as if discussing the same "plan". Id. at 166, 458 P.2d at 407. 60. Unlike
Archdiocese, Fasano applies the label "administrative" when speaking of a general
category of change decisions applying policy to specific parcels. 264 Ore. at 588, 507
P.2d at 30. Fasano/Bakeralso separate clearly the policy statement of the plan from
its implementation through zoning.
61. Fasano, 264 Ore. at 588, 507 P.2d at 30. See note 26, supra.
62. Smith, 241 Ore. at 384, 406 P.2d at 547. Roseta, 254 Ore. at 167, 458 P.2d
at 409.
63. In fact, courts were suspicious "whatever the merits" of the changes they
restricted. See discussion accompanying note 48, supra.
64. Fasano, 264 Ore. at 587-88, 507 P.2d at 29-30.
65. Since, after all, Fasano "contains no absolute standards." Id.
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Even with the Fasano standards intact, there is a broader
capacity to address the public's interest in implementing its goals
than pre-Fasano case law allowed. Where prior case law might
require proof of neighborhood change to justify zoning amendment,66 the issue of need for such amendment becomes critical to
achieving the goal.17 Certainly, the exclusionary zoning problem
can be dealt with more successfully under Fasano than under the
Smith holding that change must be proven for amendment,
"[w]hatever the merits" of the amendment."
The future of several elements of Fasano/Bakerwill depend on
the particulars of state involvement in the local planning process.
The content of plans at the local level, 9 the type and degree of
conformity demanded between local plans and their implementation,"° and even the initial review of some local rulings formerly
appealed directly to the circuit court" will depend to a large extent
on the operation of the State Land Conservation and Development
Commission (L.C.D.C.).

* *

66. See discussion accompanying note 41, supra.
67. "In proving that the change is in conformance with the comprehensive plan
*,the proof, at a minimum, should show (1) there is a public need for a change

of the kind in question, and (2) that need will be best served by changing the
classification of the particular piece of property in question as compared with other
available property." Fasano 264 Ore. at 583-84, 507 P.2d at 28. See Sullivan, supra
note 2, at 368.
68. Smith, 241 Ore. at 387, 406 P.2d at 549.
69. ORE. REV. STAT. § 197.015(4) (1973) defines comprehensive plan, and ORE.
REV. STAT. § 197.705 et seq. (1973) require local governments to prepare and adopt
comprehensive plans in accordance with state goals. The Land Conservation and
Development Commission (L.C.D.C.) is given the roles of preparing statewide goals
and guidelines-which it has done. The goals and guidelines are to be used by state
agencies, cities, counties and special districts in preparing, adopting, revising and
implementing comprehensive plans.
Comprehensive plans, and any ordinances or regulations implementing the
plans, are to comply with the statewide goals by January 1, 1976. Extensions may
be granted by the Commission in those situations where satisfactory progress is
demonstrated.
70. The L.C.D.C. has prepared a report form to be used by local governments
in reporting their compliance with state goals. The content of such reports, the
trustworthiness of local governments in filling them out, and the vigor of L.C.D.C.
in following up such reports will largely determine the success of state planning
involvement.
71. Certain classes of quasi-judicial decisions of government bodies may be
appealed by otlier government bodies to L.C.D.C. to determine the compliance of
such decisions with state goals. ORE. REV. STAT. §§ 197.005 et seq. (1973).
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Despite the contingent nature of any discussion of
Fasano/Baker,the capacity of the cases' new words to address the
problems seen in the static end state can be analyzed. The
"meaning" of new words will become settled only when the words
have been used in sufficient cases to determine the nature of the
language game in which those words are a part.7" To make projections about possible meanings of those words, scripts for different
language games can be created from the legal theories that may
explain Fasano/Baker.
A.

The Administrative Process: A Script with Open Options

Categorization of decisions in the planning process has troubled the courts. The traditional label of "legislative" for local government actions has been awarded reluctantly by Oregon courts,
as much because the courts disliked the presumption supporting
legislatively-labelled actions73 as because the courts found smalltown councils unlike state legislative bodies. 4
The Oregon Supreme Court has made glancing blows in
Roseta75 apid Fasano6 at placing the "administrative" label on
local government decisions, but the quasi-judicial decisions identified by Fasano have not been linked irrevocably to the administrative process.77 Moreover, those decisions of local government which
are not identified as quasi-judicial retain the legislative label."
There are, nonetheless, forces which press toward fuller use of
the administrative label. Most Oregon discussions of quasi-judicial
72. A. HARARI, PLACE

OF NEGLIGENCE IN THE LAW OF TORTS 11-18 (1962); L.
supra note 24, at
11-12, 83.
73. Smith and Roseta's "spot zoning" analysis was a method of blunting the
presumption in support of legislative acts.
74. Fasano, 264 Ore. at 580, 507 P.2d at 26.
75. See discussion accompanying note 59, supra.
76. Fasano uses the phrase "administrative, quasi-judicial" only as part of a
quote from a Washington decision. 264 Ore. at 580, 507 P.2d at 26.
77. The courts, having identified the quasi-judicial decisions as a method of
avoiding the legislative presumption, would be hesitant to adopt the administrative
label that would involve similar supportive presumptions. 2 K.C. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIvE LAW TREATISE § 11.06 (1958). Justice O'Connell's dissenting opinion in

WITrGENSTEIN,

Frankland urged recognition of the expertise of local administrative rulings.
Frankland at 483-88, 517 P.2d at 1056-59.
78. Fasano, 264 Ore. at 581, 507 P.2d at 27. By way of label symmetry, nonquasi-judicial decisions have also been called "quasi-legislative." Marggi v.
Ruecker, 75 Adv. Sh. 1225, 1230, 533 P.2d 1372, 1374 (Ore. App. 1975) (dissent).
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acts treat them as a category of legal process to be contrasted on
an equal footing with legislative acts,"9 much as judicial or administrative acts might be contrasted with legislative acts. In reality,
the label "quasi-judicial" usually describes a subcategory of decisions occurring within the administrative process."0
The relationship of local government decisions to. other aspects of the planning process makes the administrative label inviting. As currently labelled, a state "legislative" act (Comprehensive
Planning Coordination Statute)"1 initiates state "administrative"
acts (L.C.D.C. goals, guidelines and enforcement) governing local
"legislative" acts (comprehensive plan) which guide local "quasijudicial" acts (specific implementation decisions). The anomaly of
local "legislative" acts as subservient to state "administrative"
acts can be avoided and placed into a more appropriate setting by
relabelling. State "legislative" acts would initiate state "administrative" regulations and orders (L.C.D.C. actions)82 which govern
local "administrative" regulations (plans) which guide local
'administrative" orders.
If the full scope of the administrative label is recognized and
acted upon, much of Fasano/Baker'sanalysis takes on a new cast.
The static end state of the past is easily seen as a specific result of
the "extravagant version of the rule of law" 3 which impels lawmakers to confine discretionary power excessively. A more appropriate response to lawmaking is to seek "the optimum breadth for
discretionary power"; 4 Fasano/Bakermay open the way for such
a balance.
Past attempts to attack the exercise of zoning discretion have
followed a venerable path of responses to perceived abuse of discretion-a path demanding clear standards. 5 Given the vagueness of
the laundry lists of police power goals found in zoning enabling
acts, 8 clearer standards needed to be found elsewhere. The "comprehensive zoning plan" of Smith or the court-devised standards
of "change-or-mistake" served as a more specific standard to limit
the exercise of discretion.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.

Id.
Krasnowiecki, supra note 4 at 12; K.C. DAVIs, supra note 77, § 7.01.
ORE. REV. STAT. §§ 197.005 et seq. (1973).
See discussion, supra note 56. K.C. DAVIS, supra note 77, § 5.01.
K.C. DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE 30-33 (1969).
Id. at 52.
Id. at 27-28.
ORE. REV. STAT. §§ 215.055, 227.090 (1973).
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Although standards may be of assistance in limiting discretion
to prevent abuses, clear and complete standards may be impossible when initial enabling legislation is passed. 7 "[A]fter experience provides a foundation," clarification of legislative standards
may be possible; however, "the chief hope for confining discretionary power
[lies] in much more extensive administrative rule
making."'
The on-going drafting and enforcement of state goals and
guidelines in Oregon can give continuing clarification to the broad
state standards. Court and legislatively mandated comprehensive
planning can provide localized and more specifically useful standards.
Standards cannot decide all cases; discretion will continue to
be exercised. Unless comprehensive planning becomes a continuation of the static end state, the plans will not be so specific as to
site and use that all discretion disappears. Furthermore, local
plans themselves may need to be amended to deal with local problems; such amendments will lose one layer of standards.89
Where discretion cannot be confined by standards, it can be
87. K.C. DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE 15-17 (1969).
88. Id. at 55.
89. The procedures for amendment of comprehensive plans will be determined,
to some extent, by the courts. The Oregon Court of Appeals has held that plan
amendments which dealt with small parcels of land constitute quasi-judicial acts
for purposes of Fasano's burdens and procedures. Marggi v. Ruecker, 75 Adv. Sh.
1225, 533 P.2d 1372 (Ore. App. 1975). Such small-tract-applicable plan amendments do indeed sound like decisions which entail "the application of a general rule
or policy to specific individuals * * *."Fasano, 264 Ore. at 581, 507 P.2d at 27.
The court of appeals has suggested that such plan amendments be viewed as
a single procedure in combination with amendment of zoning to implement the
plan amendment. Tierney v. Duris, 75 Adv. Sh. 2005, 536 P.2d 435 (Ore. App.
1975).
The difficulty in conceptualizing about such small-tract plan amendments in
Fasano's terms is that no "general rule or policy" can be easily identified which
such amendments might be following. In time, perhaps the L.C.D.C. goals and
guidelines will serve such a "general rule" function for plan amendments.
In addition to the conceptual difficulty of applying Fasanoto such plan amendments, there is a legal issue raised as well. The special rule applicable to small-tract
plan amendments must be reconciled with Baker's dictum that the "plan is flexible
and subject to change when the needs of the community demand. '[Ulnlike [a
constitution] it is subject to amendatory procedures not significantly different from
the course followed in enacting ordinary legislation.' " Baker, 75 Adv. Sh. at 1074,
533 P.2d at 775, citing Haar, The Master Plan: An Imperfect Constitution,20 LAW
AND CONTEMP. PROB. 353, 375 (1955).
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exercised to "achieve a higher quality of justice" by being structured in new ways." Professor Davis has proposed that careful
procedures in the exercise of discretion can susbstitute for fully
detailed standards to govern that discretion. In 1963, when Dan
Mandelker tried to analyze zoning in light of Professor Davis'
suggestion, 9' he found one case using Davis' views, Warren v. Marion County,92 which dealt with state-wide building codes delegated
to local government. Since 1963, other jurisdictions have embraced
Davis' viewpoint. 3 Fasano/Baker could function as an attempt
both to maximize standards for discretion, by mandating comprehensive plans, and to implement structures for discretion by requiring fair decision procedures. The actual content of
Fasano/Baker fits nicely within Davis' description of the guideposts to structuring discretion:
The seven instruments that are most useful in the structuring of
discretionary power are open plans, open policy statements, open
rules, open findings, open reasons, open precedents, and fair
informal procedure. 4
Except for a systematic method of recording local precedent
in deciding quasi-judicial cases, Fasano/Bakerand its progeny
have addressed all of those instruments. Open plans and policy
statements are contained in comprehensive plans. Open rules are
mandated for local governments by post-Fasano legislation enabling hearing examiners to make quasi-judicial records.95 Open
findings and open reasons have been required by recent opinions.9"
Fair informal procedures are the very essence of Fasano's procedural dicta.97
The focus of inquiries in future cases under such a view would
be a search for fairer decisions, not a preoccupation with the putative property rights of either applicants or neighbors. In deciding
those cases, "the purpose is not to maximize the use of the seven
90. K.C. DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE 97 (1969).
91. Mandelker, supra note 33, at 80.
92. 222 Ore. 307, 353 P.2d 257 (1960).
93. See the excellent discussion of Washington cases by Justice Finley in his
concurring opinion, Yakima County Clean Air Auth! v. Glascam Bldrs., Inc., 534
P.2d 33, 37-39 (Wash. 1975).
94. K.C. DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE 98 (1969).
95. ORE. REV. STAT. §§ 215.412; 227.170 (1973).
96. See infra at notes 111-113.
97. Supra note 57.

ENVIRONMENTAL LAW

[Vol. 6

methods of structuring but to locate the optimum degree of structuring in each respect for each discretionary power.""
B.

ConstitutionalDue Process: A Script with Ties to the Past

The definition of the interests of parties to litigation and the
character of remedies granted to protect those interests will continue to occur in the judiciary, whether the judiciary is interpreting
constitutional or statutory standards." The nature of the interests
of parties litigating under Fasano will depend on the courts' reasons for evaluating those interests.
Chief Judge Schwab of the Oregon Court of Appeals has concluded that the procedural rules of Fasano are "based on due process considerations." 100 Judge Schwab reached his conclusion because he could find "no possible statutory basis for that part of
Fasano" and because the law review article whose analysis the
Fasano opinion cited and "apparently adopted" relied "on constitutional grounds."'' If Judge Schwab's conclusion is valid, then
the interests of parties must be viewed in terms of the constitutional right to due process.
The requirements of procedural due process apply only to the
deprivation of interests encompassed by the Fourteenth Amendment's protection of liberty anc property. 02
While this court has not attempted to define with exactness the
liberty * * * guaranteed, the term has received much consideration
and * * * it denotes * * * the right of the individual * * * generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized * * * as essential to
the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men. 03
If the interests protected by due process in quasi-judicial hearings implementing land use plans are of the level "essential to the
orderly pursuit of happiness by free men," the burden resting on
one who would remove such interests should be heavy indeed.
Since it appears, moreover, that both proponents and, opponents
98. K.C. DAvis, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE 99 (1969).
99. See, e.g., Frankland, 267 Ore. at 474-77, 517 P.2d at 1052-54; Duddles, 75
Adv. Sh. at 1661-69, 535 P.2d at 589-93.
100. West v. City of Astoria, 99 Adv. Sh. 924, 938, 524 P.2d 1216, 1223 (Ore.
App. 1974).
101. Id.
102. Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 566, 569 (1972).
103. Id. at 572, quoting Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).
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of quasi-judicial acts have such interests at stake,' 4 it is inevitable
that one side or the other at each such proceeding will lose some
"privileges * * * essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by
free men." To place the issue in the context of Fasano, it is "essential to the happiness of free men" like Louis Fasano that only
single family houses like his own be built around him; likewise, it
is "essential to the happiness of free men" in A.G.S. Development
Company that they be permitted to construct a mobile home park
in 32 acres now zoned for single family. To paraphrase a conclusion
of the United States Supreme Court, "there might be cases in
which" a zone change arose "under such circumstances that interests in liberty would be implicated. But this is not such a case."" 5
If liberty is not at stake in Fasano, then property must be
under threat.
104. Given that both the county and the landowner were satisfied with the
result of the local government decision in Fasano while neither were satisfied by
its reversal, it is a fair inference that Fasano was protecting the rights of the person
who was seeking the court's result-the neighboring landowner/opponent. Auckland v. Board of County Comm'rs, 75 Adv. Sh. 1992, 1995 536 P.2d 444, 447 (Ore.
App. 1975), has granted proponents of zone change the protection of Fasanoquasijudicial standards.
105. Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. at 573.
An alternate approach to the problem of "liberty" for due process purposes
might begin with the analysis of Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954):
"[Tihe concepts of equal protection and due process, both stemming
from our American ideal of fairness, are not mutually exclusive. The 'equal
protection of the laws' is a more explicit safeguard of prohibited unfairness
than 'due process of law' * * * [blut * * * discrimination may be so unjustifiable as to be violative of due process." Id. at 499.
Bolling's rationale was devised for actions of the federal government to which
14th amendment "equal protection" is not applicable. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394
U.S. 618, 655 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting). However, it is conceivable that state
or local governments could commit discrimination "so unjustifiable as to be violative of due process."
The "spot zoning" concept, which such pre-Fasanocases as Smith and Roseta
used to void small-area amendments, also had origins in the equal protection idea

of fairness. D.

MANDELKER, THE ZONING DILEMMA

83 (1971); Heyman, Land Regula-

tion and ComprehensivePlanning,in THE NEW ZONIAG, supra note 4, at 26-32. This
interest is uniformity of treatment in zoning would be applicable to both opponents
and proponents of administrative actions. Fasano could then be an extension of the
"spot zoning" concept under the new name of "due process" to a broader class of
cases than amendment.
Finding such continuity from Smith to Fasano would further complicate the
task of extracting Fasano's newness from Smith's commitment to the static end
state of which "spot zoning" is a specific expression.
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The * * * procedural protection of property is a safeguard of
the security of interests that a person has already acquired in specific benefits. These interests-property interests-may take many
forms.'0
[P]roperty denotes a broad range of interests that are secured
by "existing rules or understandings." * * * A person's interest in a
benefit is a "property" interest for due process purposes if there are
such rules or mutually explicit understandings that support his
claim of entitlement to the benefit and that he may invoke at a
hearing. ' "7
One class whose "property for due process purposes'' is involved in zone changes is the owner of the land proposed for rezoning; at least, Chief Judge Schwab has asserted that "procedurally,
the proponent is protected by the Fasano quasi-judicial
standards."' ' If the proponent is exercising rights to "security of
interests that a person has already acquired" rather than trying to
acquire new interest in a more intensive use, what is the nature of
the right already acquired? Conceivably, the regular pattern of
granting zone changes to accommodate the schemes of pr 6 perty
owners is "secured by 'existing * * * understandings.' " Could the
system of abusive changes which the court tried to attack in
Fasano constitute the property right which gives rise to the protections of Fasano? The owner of a parcel which is proposed for rezoning to a less intensive use against the owner's objection clearly has
an already-acquired interest to serve as "procedural property";
however, all of the cases litigated under Fasano have involved
owners seeking change to greater intensity.
The question of procedural property is also perplexing when
106. Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. at 576.
107. Perry v. Sinderman, 408 U.S. 593, 601 (1972).
108. The Court's use of the phrase "property for due process purposes" seems
to indicate a significant limitation on the nature of those interests to which the
Court grants procedural protections. The Court has not, for example, proceeded to
discussion of such interests as welfare income as "property for just compensation
purposes" under the taking clause. Thus, "property for due process purposes"
(procedural property) may differ from property for taking clause purposes. While
the United States Supreme Court may be capable of such delicate mental gymnastics, there is no assurance that other judges will resist an invitation to carry over
an identification of an interests in a zoning dispute as procedural property to a
further identification of the same interests as substantive property under the taking
clause. Thus, the issue of compensable zoning may be creeping into resolution
through procedural protections.
109. Auckland, 75 Adv. Sh. at 1995, 536 P.2d at 447.
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applied to the participants who do not own the parcel subject to
chafige. In cases involving change to greater intensity, the opponents may be protecting the very covenant-like rights to rely on
existing zoning which were seen in pre-Fasanocases. The rights of
opponents could then lead directly back to the thinking from
which Fasano should have freed us."'
The apparent strength of the "property" rights of opponents
and the comparative weakness of the "property" rights of proponents could lead to greater protection for the due process of opponents than is given to proponents and a further systematic bias
against change. Some evidence of this skewed due process standard already exists. Findings of fact to support grants of change
of zone must be sufficient "to aid the court in determining what
evidence the council believed, and whether its conclusion was supported by reliable, probative and substantial evidence."'' For denial of a zone change, findings are sufficient if they "in effect recite
that 'plaintiff failed to sustain his burden of proof.""' 2 Since the
court must take the role of ascertaining whether there is substantial evidence to support the decision of local officials regardless of
the result reached by local officials, the findings would need to be
"sufficient to aid the court" in any event if the procedural rights
of all parties were to be protected.
Further, covenant-like thinking in post-Fasano cases could
lead to the same difficulties in remedies that existed in pre-Fasano
cases. In discussing standing to prosecute a writ of review proceeding from the granting of a zone change, Chief Judge Schwab said:
110. A property-like right in neighboring landowners could also be found
through the nuisance analysis which early characterized discussion in court analysis
of zoning under the police power. See, e.g., Euclid v. Ambler Realty, 272 U.S. 365
(1926). See also, the discussion of externalities in nuisance and zoning in
MANDELKER, supra note 4, .at23. Althought the traditional remedy for nuisance-type
claims of property has been injunction, one current case could place the public
interest again subject to satisfaction by payment to a few neighboring landowners.
Boomer v. Atlantic Cement, 26 N.Y.2d 219, 309 N.Y.S.2d 312, 257 N.E. 2d 870
(1970).
111. South Central Association of Neighbors, Inc., v. Lindsey, 75 Adv. Sh.
1978, 1982, 535 P.2d 1381, 1384 (Ore. App., 1975).
112. Auckland, 75 Adv. Sh. at 1996, 536 P.2d at 447. Accord, Dickinson, 75
Adv. Sh. at 1423, 533 P.2d at 1397:
"If the Board had granted a change we might well hold findings of so general
a nature as those above to be not sufficiently specific. However, they are
sufficient to support orders holding that he who had the burden of proof had
not met it."
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We continue to believe that contiguous ownership should not be
the sine qua non of standing; if it were, land developers could effectively insulate some zone-change decisions from judicial review if
they were the only contiguous owner."'
The same concern still applies if standing is extended only
slightly beyond the immediately contiguous owners; so long as the
damages payable to buy off those with standing is less than the
profit to be realized, "land developers could effectively insulate
some zone-change decisions from judicial review." If the right to
procedural fairness in quasi-judicial hearings is purely one of constitutional due process, it is arguable that the class of those who
possess "procedural property" could be limited enough to permit
waiver of the hearing fairness by all members of that class. What
justification could those who have no procedural property raise to
the lack of due process?
CONCLUSION

The need for an approach to land use different from that used
in pre-Fasano cases is evident. Fasano in combination with the
result in Baker speaks to the major limitations of that earlier system. Whether Fasano'sfull capacity to overcome those limitations
is realized will depend on a number of variables including the
development of the state administrative procedures by the
L.C.D.C., the added credibility that could be given to local activities by vigorous administration of the L.C.D.C. and the capacity
of the judiciary to alter its thinking along with its phrases. In the
meanwhile, the bar will be vigorously serving clients by taking full
advantage of both the new directions contained in Fasano and the
old ideas that act as a context for Fasano; the subsequent materials in this series of articles should be of use to those lawyers whose
clients would be served by either argument technique and to those
who will deal with those lawyers.
113. Duddles, 75 Adv. Sh. at 1666, 535 P.2d at 592.

